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Abstract 
Scholarship on conflict-generated diasporas has identified the need to consider 
diaspora mobilizations in multiple contexts and how they are affected by local and 
global processes. I argue that diasporas react with mobilizations to global events that 
take place not only in host-states and home-states but also in other locations to which 
diasporas are transnationally connected. I illustrate the theoretical concepts with 
empirical discussion about global diaspora activism for Kosovo and Palestinian 
statehood. Two categories of global events, critical junctures and transformative events, 
can be distinguished, with effects on diaspora mobilization depending on the 
sociospatial context in which diasporas are embedded. Critical junctures can transform 
international and state structures and institutions, and change the position of a 
strategic center from “outside” to “inside” a homeland territory and vice versa. 
Transformative events are less powerful and can change diaspora mobilization 
trajectories. In contexts where diasporas have relatively strong positionality vis-à-vis 
other actors in a transnational social field, diaspora mobilization is more likely to be 
sustained in response to critical junctures and transformative events.  
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 Introduction 
Scholarship on diaspora mobilization is increasingly interested in theorizing 
about multiple contexts in which diasporas are embedded, and how diaspora 
mobilizations are affected by various local and global factors (Adamson and Demetriou 
2007, Lyons and Mandaville 2010, Adamson 2016, Koinova 2012, 2014, Brkanic 
2016, Brinkerhoff 2016, Cochrane 2015, Gabiam and Fiddian-Quasmiyeh 2016). 
Alongside domestic and external factors, specific critical events in the homeland have 
been found to be conducive to mobilizations. They have been related to conflict and 
regime change (Koopmans and Statham 2004), rapid popularization of nationalist 
movements (Sökefeld 2006), violence and grave violations of human rights (Demmers 
2007, Koinova 2011), breakdown of peace processes (Orjuela 2008), elections (Pfeffer 
2015), formation or opposition to legislation (Brinkerhoff 2008), referendums (Natali 
2007, Koinova 2010), and truth commissions (Young and Park 2009), among others.  
This article inaugurates a conversation about the effects of such events across 
the globe. I focus particularly on mobilization of conflict-generated diasporas, and on 
events associated with what path-dependence literature calls “critical junctures” (Collier 
and Collier 1991, Cappoccia and Kelemen 2007, Mahoney 2001, Pierson 2004) and 
social movements literature calls “transformative events” (McAdam and Sewell 2001, 
Morris 2004, Hess and Martin 2006) to generate significant collective action. I argue 
that by transforming international order and state structures and institutions, critical 
junctures have the capacity to change the position of the strategic center for pursuit of a 
homeland-oriented goal from “outside” to “inside” a homeland territory, and vice versa. 
Transformative events are less powerful and have the capacity primarily to change 
diaspora mobilization trajectories. Both are transmitted through the transnational 
social fields in which diasporas operate and the contexts in which they are embedded. 
Hence, critical events emerge from a variety of global locations, not simply host-states or 
home-states. Diaspora mobilization specificities are shaped by diasporas’ geographical 
and sociospatial embeddedness in different global locations. In contexts where 
diasporas have relatively strong positionality vis-à-vis other actors in a transnational 
social field, diaspora mobilization is more likely to remain sustained in response to 
critical junctures and transformative events. 
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This article offers a theoretical discussion about the utility of “critical junctures” 
and “transformative events” to analyze diaspora collective action in various global 
locations. It also shows how the positionality of a diaspora in a transnational social field 
empowers differently diaspora entrepreneurs to mobilize in response to critical events 
in one part of the globe compared to another. It also draws empirical evidence from 
long-term diaspora transnational movements for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood.   
 
Defining the Concepts 
I use the definition of “diaspora” by Adamson and Demetriou (2007), 
emphasizing transnational connectivity and collective action: “a diaspora can be 
identified as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded 
over time to: 1) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a 
sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and 2) 
display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity 
through a developed internal organizational framework and transnational links” 
(2007:497).  
A “diaspora entrepreneur” is a formal or informal leader in a certain diaspora 
group, who makes claims and organizes on behalf of the original homeland. They have 
what Brinkerhoff (2013, 2016) calls “in-between advantage,” with their positioning 
between two worlds and ability to connect them in what social networks analysis calls a 
“brokerage” mechanism (Koinova 2011, Adamson 2013), and political geographers call 
in-between-ness of “here” and “there” (Mavroudi 2008), with a sense of “multi-centered 
belongings” (Gabiam and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016). In line with Brubaker’s (2005) 
assertion that claim-making is important in diaspora politics, I consider diaspora 
entrepreneurs only individuals who make claims on behalf of a homeland. Claims are 
understood as “units of strategic action,” expressions of political opinion in physical or 
verbal form (Koopmans 2002, Koopmans et al. 2005). “Diaspora mobilization” denotes 
ideational frames and practices used by diaspora entrepreneurs who make claims and 
mobilize resources in support of homeland-oriented goals. For the purposes of this 
article, diaspora mobilization is operationalized on the duration in which it occurs, and 
can take place in sustained or ad hoc ways (Koinova 2016).  
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Critical Junctures and Transformative Events  
Political events of great magnitude are not new, as century-long scholarship on 
revolutions, democratization, conflicts, and social movements has shown. The French 
revolution, beginnings and endings of world wars, comprehensive regime 
transformations such as the end of the Cold War, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have 
shaped decades of history. Short periods of time that bring about profound 
transformations and long-term legacies are defined as “critical junctures.” As Collier 
and Collier 1991, Cappoccia and Kelemen 2007, Mahoney 2001, Pierson 2004 point 
out, contingencies during such short periods of uncertainty allow a variety of actors to 
shape events, decisions, and policies with long-term consequences. Elite-based, 
institutional, economic, and value-based changes transform international order, states, 
and societies. After critical junctures end, path-dependent processes ensue, reinforcing 
relationships and institutions established during this volatile period.  
Critical junctures have not been studied systematically in transnational diaspora 
politics, not least because this is a relatively new research field. In more established 
research agendas of democratization and social revolutions, the analytical focus has 
been on domestic actors and their agency in institutional and value-based 
transformations, not on international actors, and even less so on diasporas as identity-
based actors. The idea of “critical juncture” has been mentioned in association with 
diaspora politics, with attribution of different meanings. By contrast to political 
opportunity structures, with durable implications on diaspora behavior, critical 
junctures have been considered triggers of actions (Gertheiss 2016:76). Diasporas “tend 
to reconstitute themselves at the critical juncture between ontological ambivalence and 
an essentializing politics of identity” (Pibrhai 2009:16). The focused contributions of 
African-American writers and activists – such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Malcolm X, and Maya 
Angelou – are considered a critical juncture for the formation of African-American 
diaspora identity. Their writings formed durable discourses that later emerged in the 
self-definitions of African-Americans (Okpewho et al. 1999). The formation of a 
Tibetan identity has been considered a “critical juncture” for the expansion of diaspora 
activism (Hess, 2009).  
This article builds on my earlier comparative work on path-dependence, 
showing that diasporas are not always consequential in shaping domestic politics. 
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During the collapse of communism (1989-1992), contingent decisions among domestic 
and international actors led to informal institutionalization of conflict dynamics in 
post-communist polities. But diasporas – unlike international organizations or kin-
states – were not active agents in forming policy responses (Koinova 2013). The major 
difference between diasporas who were somewhat engaged in shaping homeland 
political affairs (Ukrainian diaspora, see also Djuric 2003 and Brkanic 2016 on the 
Croatian diaspora), and those who were not (Albanian, Armenian, Bulgarian, 
Macedonian, Serbian) was in whether they had established linkages with secessionist 
elites before the collapse of communism (Koinova 2011, 2013). During the Cold War, 
diasporas in Western countries and under communism were separated by the Iron 
Curtain, and had only rare exchanges with each other.  
 “Transformative events” are defined conceptually in scholarship on social 
movements. Despite certain semantic similarities, “transformative events” could not be 
deemed theoretically equal to “critical junctures,” the latter profoundly reshaping 
polities rather than changing social movement trajectories. Transformative events are 
turning points in a social movement that dramatically increase or decrease mobilization 
(McAdam and Sewell 2001, Morris 2004, Hess and Martin 2006). They are 
“concentrated moments of political and cultural creativity when the logic of historical 
development is reconfigured by human action but by no means abolished” (McAdam 
and Sewell 2001:102). Transformative events could be part of protest cycles, be 
clustered as related sequences of events (Sewell 1996, Alimi 2007), and introduce or 
perfect a new tactic, or catapult a charismatic leader into the movement (Reed 2002). 
Even if protests could be routinized, some are “eventful” as they transform social 
movement trajectories, become an arena of creative debates, bring about network 
formation, and develop solidarity in action (Della Porta 2008:30-32).  
For example, the French Revolution (1789-1799) was a critical juncture that 
punctuated the equilibrium of an international order based on monarchical power and 
paved the way for republicanism in domestic and international politics. A 
“transformative event” occurred when the revolutionaries took over the Bastille (14 July 
1789). This event instilled a sense of material and symbolic victory over the outgoing 
regime, increased the confidence of revolutionaries, and helped the movement expand 
(Sewell 1996).  
Koinova Critical Junctures and Transformative Events in Diaspora Mobilization, part of JEMS Special 
issue on “Diaspora Mobilizations for Conflict and Postconflict Reconstruction” 
	   6	  
“Transformative events” have been mentioned sporadically in narratives, but 
not explicitly theorized in transnational diaspora politics. Sökefeld argues that critical 
events could be associated with formation of a diaspora. Construction of a separate 
Kashmiri diaspora in the UK could be attributed to the rise of anti-Indian insurgency 
and violence in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989 and diaspora association with Khalistan 
(2006:273). Violent events in Kosovo and Sri Lanka also galvanized their diasporas 
(Demmers 2007, Koinova 2011), as did the gradual breakdown of the peace process in 
Sri Lanka (Orjuela 2008). During a cease-fire, diaspora activists gained access to the 
militant Liberal Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to exert moderate influence, but when 
war resumed the space for moderation shrank (Orjuela 2008). The 2009 final battle, 
which crushed the LTTE, also became a critical event for diaspora mobilization (Hess 
and Kopf 2014, see also Orjuela and Goodwin in this volume). Homeland crises can 
inspire renewed interest in later diaspora generations, as in the Afghani diaspora 
(Brinkerhoff 2004, Kerlin 2008), higher remittance rates as among Somalis abroad 
(Carling et al. 2012), and vibrant online activism (Brinkerhoff 2009). 
Despite mentioning the strong effects of crises on diaspora mobilization, 
considered in their variety in the Introduction to this collection, these works do not 
explicitly theorize about transformative events. I argued that “transformative events 
relate to significant threats to diasporic identity – such as grave violations of human 
rights – or to threats to deeply entrenched diaspora interests – such as threats to the 
success of a secessionist movement” (2011:339). Before the 1998 killing of the extended 
family of a Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leader in the town of Prekaz in Kosovo, the 
Albanian diaspora was engaged in sponsoring the Kosovo Albanian nonviolent 
movement and its parallel structures aiming to secede from Serbia. After 1998, diaspora 
mobilization expanded in scope and modes of operation, from nonviolent to violent 
actions. Radical actors became mainstream at home and abroad, and fund-raising and 
drafting of fighters expanded in Europe and the US (2011, 2013). The causal 
implications of this event became even clearer during the 2013 speech of former 
Kosovo Diaspora Minister Ibrahim Makkolli. He argued that Prekaz is a “holy place, 
where the separation of two historical epochs, that of slavery and free future,” 
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occurred.1 The Prekaz event was not a critical juncture, as it did not change state 
institutions, social structures, or economic and international order. It was a 
transformative event, based on grave violations of human rights, that elevated the 
power of radical actors in Kosovo’s clandestine politics and expanded the domestic and 
international scope of mobilization.  
Three important conclusions emerge from this literature review. First is a 
wealth of arguments about critical events in the homeland that entice diasporas to 
engage with homeland political affairs, responding to political developments. Second, 
without systematic theorizing about critical junctures and transformative events for 
diaspora politics, the boundaries between the terms remain blurred. Whereas both 
critical junctures and transformative events are difficult to recognize while they are 
happening, the magnitude of changes they trigger in institutions, structures, and social 
actors speaks of how they could be classified: critical junctures can transform 
international and state institutions and societies and thereby reshape the role of a 
diaspora as a non-state actor and its relationship to the state; transformative events are 
limited to non-state actors’ mobilization trajectories, in this case of diasporas. 
Transformative events may be part of critical junctures (taking over the Bastille during 
the French Revolution) or single events (the 1998 Drenica massacre in Kosovo), which 
expand an already organized diaspora movement. Third, most of the discussion still 
focuses on critical events in the original homeland without considering diasporas’ 
contextual embeddedness in different global locations. Yet critical events in other 
contexts than the original homeland may still be important for diaspora mobilization.  
 
Transnational Social Fields and Contested Sovereignty  
In the early 2000s the transnationalism literature in anthropology and sociology 
developed an analytical perspective to account for the operation of migrants in 
“transnational social structures,” independent of nation-states but embedded in them. 
The concept of a “transnational social field” added a transnational dimension to 
Bourdieu’s ideas about the “social field” as a domain where repeated formal and 
informal interactions between individuals and institutions structure their positions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Koinova participant observation, Prekaz, Kosovo, 3 August 2013, G Brajshori translation of recorded 
speech by Minister Makolli.. 
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power (Bourdieu 1985). Transnational migrants, embedded in networks stretching 
simultaneously across multiple states, reflect cultural production, identities, and social 
positions of power migrants occupy in multiple locations (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 
2004). An adjacent term often used interchangeably, “transnational social spaces,” 
emphasizes  sustained ties of geographically mobile persons, networks, and institutions, 
where reciprocity, exchange, and solidarity take place (Faist 2000, Pries 2001). Both the 
“transnational social field” as a conglomeration of “personal networks” and the 
“transnational social space” as a conglomeration of “whole networks” are embedded in 
specific locations (Molina et al. 2014): host-states, home-states, and other global 
locations.  
This article offers a continuation of theorizing started in the Introduction to 
this special issue about the need to consider analysis beyond a triangular model of 
relationships between home-states, host-states, and diasporas, and about diaspora 
responses to broader geopolitical events. In earlier work I have considered a specific 
conglomeration of factors I called a Politically Relevant Environment (PRE), affecting 
diaspora entrepreneurs in contextually specific ways. These factors stem from the 
homeland and host-land, but notably also from the transnational social field in which 
diasporas operate, and supranational and global levels of international affairs (Koinova 
2014). The transnational social field is constituted of linkages and interactions among 
ethnonational and religious brethren in different locations. Diasporas may be long-term 
minorities or recent settlers in adjacent territories to a kin-state, or live in distant 
locations but associate with those territories or with a specific place in them, forming a 
translocal connection to it.2   
Yet each PRE is context-specific. For example, diaspora entrepreneurs could be 
located physically in Brussels, and so geographically well positioned to lobby European 
institutions. But their positionality – the relative power they perceive or are perceived as 
deriving from their social positions in a specific context (Koinova 2012) – would be 
relatively weak in Brussels, if they maintain minimal or no social linkages to European 
institutions. They could be embedded in a powerful country or global power, but if the 
transnational social field is not widespread or diaspora activism is strongly suppressed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 On translocalism: Smith and Guarnizo 1998 in sociology; Karabegovic 2016 in political science. On 
distant vs. adjacent diasporas: Van Hear and Cohen 2016. 
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their positionality would remain weak and they would not be empowered. Consider, 
for example, the strong positionality of Kurdish diaspora entrepreneurs in Europe, 
where the transnational social field is widespread and dense linkages exist among 
diaspora activists and networks, versus their relatively weak positionality in 
Washington. Kurdish politics is much less important strategically for the US than for 
Europe unless it is related to the war on terrorism and ISIS.3 Hence, it is important not 
only where diaspora entrepreneurs are located, but how they are linked to that context, 
relative to other actors in the field.	  
Critical junctures or transformative events do not emanate from a homeland or 
host-land only, but from different points of the transnational social field, observed by 
diaspora entrepreneurs also embedded in different parts of that field. Such effects are 
not confined to conflict-generated diasporas and their linkages to polities experiencing 
contested sovereignty, but are highly visible in such cases. This is because homelands 
with contested sovereignty are often historically split between ethnonational groups in 
their own state and minorities in adjacent territories. Original homelands can also be 
weak, fragile states, where authorities have no legitimate control over use of violence in 
the entire territory, and conflicts may be commonplace. If violence ensues, refugees flee 
from the kin-state and remain temporarily or more permanently in neighboring 
territories (Lischer 2005, Salehyan 2007), connecting to the diaspora from there. When 
a diaspora entrepreneur associates with territories external to the kin-state, the 
homeland is no longer the kin-state but a place in another state: an autonomous region, 
an enclave, or simply another place to which diaspora linkages exist. See Figure 1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  On Kurdish diaspora politics in Europe see van Bruinessen 2000, Wahlbeck 2001, Østergaard-Nielsen 
2006, Baser 2015, Demir 2015, Tas 2016. On Kurdish diaspora politics in the US see Danilovich 2016.	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For example, Croats or Serbs in the diaspora need not associate their real or 
imaginary homeland with Croatia or Serbia proper. They might be translocally linked 
to Bosnia, Serbia, or other parts of the Croat and Serb transnational social fields. After 
the breakup of former Yugoslavia in 1991, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
emerged as separate states. Yet the transnational social field of each diaspora 
incorporates Croats, Serbs, or Bosniaks in different global locations and is built on 
linkages formed primarily on a nationalist, not a citizenship principle. Even if there are 
exceptions, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs are not usually incorporated into 
Bosnian networks, but into the mainstream diaspora organizations of Croats and Serbs 
(Koinova 2016, Brkanic 2016), and hence into the Croat and Serb transnational social 
fields. 
Similar examples can be given about other diasporas and their linkages to 
polities experiencing contested sovereignty. Kurds in Europe are linked to Kurds-
inhabited areas of Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan, areas in Iran, Syria, and more recently 
numerous European locations—Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the Netherlands (Baser 
2015, Tas 2016). Armenians in the diaspora are linked to Turkey through activism for 
the recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide, even though generations of them have 
not lived in those territories (Tölölyan 2000, Panossian 1998). Armenians can also be 
linked to Armenia proper and Nagorno-Karabakh and other areas in the Middle East – 
such as Lebanon and Iran – where many have been living as a result of the dispersal 
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during the genocide. Their transnational social field spans Europe and America 
(Koinova 2017). 
Critical junctures and transformative events have different capacities to 
introduce change in diaspora mobilizations. With their profound effects on changes of 
international order, state structures, and societies, critical junctures can change the 
position of the strategic center to pursue a homeland-oriented goal from “outside” to 
“inside” a homeland territory, and vice versa. A strategic center can be formed outside a 
homeland territory after exiles are dispersed from the homeland as a result of 
revolution, regime change, large-scale persecution, and other political phenomena. This 
is the story of numerous exiled movements throughout human history. That movement 
could then act as a strategic center from “outside” a homeland territory, seeking to 
affect homeland political processes. As result of a critical juncture and the multiple 
uncertainties and volatilities it triggers in domestic and international politics, the 
strategic center could become embedded into a specific state or territory. For example, 
Armenian diaspora parties were formed after the 1915 Armenian genocide conducted 
by the collapsing Ottoman Empire. Banned from Soviet Armenia, they strategized from 
outside the state on how to affect processes within the state territory. They became 
embedded into Armenian state territory only after the end of the Cold War, a major 
critical juncture that transformed international order and created an opening for those 
parties to become territorially embedded in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh 
(Panossian 1998, Koinova 2011). See Figure 2.  
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When critical junctures take place in international and domestic politics, 
diasporas in different contexts of the transnational social field become affected 
systemically, and their roles are likely to change drastically. Transformative events are 
less powerful, as they do not change societal and institutional structures domestically 
and internationally, but have the capacity to change primarily diaspora mobilization 
trajectories. Diasporas remain embedded where they are, but their strategies and tactics 
change in the pursuit of a homeland-oriented goal. Both critical junctures and 
transformative events are transmitted through transnational social fields in which 
diasporas operate, and emerge from a variety of global locations, not simply from host-
states or home-states. Contextual sociospatial specificities then shape how such critical 
junctures and transformative events would be mobilized upon. Contexts in which 
diaspora entrepreneurs are empowered through relatively strong positionality vis-à-vis 
other actors in the field would be more conducive to sustained diaspora mobilization 
than those not experienced as empowering. 
I further offer deeper exploration of selected critical junctures and 
transformative events in the political struggles of diaspora involvement for Kosovo and 
Palestinian statehood. These cases were selected for comparison, as both de facto states 
experiencing limited domestic and minimal external sovereignty. There is local 
governance in both Kosovo and Palestine through the Palestinian authority, but the 
proto-states have received only some degree of international recognition (with Kosovo 
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more advanced on the statehood recognition agenda than Palestine). Minorities and 
refugees living in adjacent territories to the homeland are numerous, hence building 
rich and multi-faceted transnational social fields in which diasporas operate and 
observe each other. Finally, both movements have been focused long-term on state 
recognition, thus offering multiple critical events to select from and analyze as either 
critical junctures or transformative events. 
 
Diaspora Mobilization for Kosovo Statehood  
A transnational social field built through interactions among Albanians has 
emerged due to long-term nationalist movements related to state formation in the 20th 
century, and subsequent emigration from Albanians-inhabited areas in the Balkans. 
The movement for Kosovo independence dates to the Treaty of London (1913), when 
territorial adjustments left almost half the Albanian population outside the borders of 
the newly established Albanian state (Malcolm 1998). The First and Second World 
Wars did not resolve the issue of Kosovo, an adjacent territory to the north of Albania, 
inhabited primarily by Albanians. Kosovo remained part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
in the interwar period (1918–1939) and of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) under communism (1945-1992). It declared independence for the first time in 
1991, two years after its autonomy was curtailed in the SFRY, and for the second time 
in 2008, with US and EU endorsement. Throughout the long Kosovo state evolution 
process, emigration has been prevalent. The US started attracting immigrants in the 
early 20th century (Hockenos 2003). Switzerland and Germany became destinations in 
the late 1960s and 1970s, when interstate treaties sent “guest-workers” to support the 
rising West European postwar economies. Kosovo migration also took place after the 
1981 Kosovo riots and their suppression (Malcolm 1998, Hockenos 2003), and 
especially during the 1990s, when Kosovo was an ethnically segregated territory within 
collapsing Yugoslavia. 
Since much attention has been paid to the end of communism and Yugoslavia’s 
disintegration (1987-1992) (Hockenos 2003, Perritt 2008, Koinova 2011, 2013a,b), I 
will refrain from further analyzing this critical juncture, and focus on other events. I 
select the critical juncture of NATO’s 1999 military intervention in Kosovo, and two 
transformative events: the 2004 mob violence from within Kosovo as a homeland, and 
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the 2015 violence from outside Kosovo, in Kumanovo in the Albanian-inhabited areas 
of Macedonia.  
NATO’s intervention constitutes a critical juncture that fundamentally redefined 
Kosovo’s sovereignty, even if it did not bring immediate recognition of statehood. 
Before 1999, Kosovo was legally an autonomous region within Serbia, with curtailed 
autonomy from 1989, and a segregated Albanian population dismissed from schools 
and public service positions. After NATO’s 1999 military defeat of Serbia, Kosovo still 
remained officially part of it, but started being governed through what Krasner (2004) 
calls “shared sovereignty” and Fearon and Laitin (2004) call “neo-trusteeship”: a 
conglomeration of emerging domestic institutions (local and central government, 
parliament) and international institutions, states, and domestic actors, governed by the 
UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with assistance from the OSCE and EU.  
The fundamental changes of international and domestic politics as a result of 
NATO’s intervention also reconfigured the ways the diaspora related territorially to 
Kosovo as a homeland. Prior to 1999, diaspora activism was very strong “outside” the 
homeland territory, and a strategic center operated with Kosovo parallel institutions 
anchored in multiple countries in the Western hemisphere. In the 1990s, they were 
organized by the moderate Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), with parallel 
government headquarters in Bonn, Germany. The diaspora was levied a 3% informal 
tax to support the parallel institutions. Further organizing and fund-raising campaigns 
took place in 1997-1999, when the radical KLA enhanced its influence in diaspora 
circles (Hockenos 2003, Perritt 2008, Koinova 2011).  
After 1999, there was a fundamental reconfiguration of relations between 
diaspora and emerging homeland institutions, with diaspora mobilizations drastically 
subsiding from “outside” the de facto state. Several respondents in the US and Europe 
argued that the diaspora, exhausted from its concerted effort during the secessionist 
period, turned from supporting the emerging state and continued to helping their 
families rebuild homes and traumatized lives (Koinova 2011:449, R1, 2013, R2, 2013). 
Important political figures from the diaspora returned to Kosovo to become part of the 
parliament and government, most notably Hashim Thaci, who previously headed the 
KLA, and Bujar Bukoshi, who previously headed the LDK parallel government, as did 
numerous other political returnees previously involved in Kosovo’s liberation struggle. 
Koinova Critical Junctures and Transformative Events in Diaspora Mobilization, part of JEMS Special 
issue on “Diaspora Mobilizations for Conflict and Postconflict Reconstruction” 
	   15	  
Hence, the critical juncture of NATO’s 1999 intervention triggered simultaneously 
diaspora disengagement with homeland affairs and re-embedding of crucial diaspora 
agents in homeland territory, who started playing strategic roles from “inside” the de 
facto state.  
Although relations between diaspora and homeland were fundamentally 
redefined in territorial terms, contextual specificities continued to shape diaspora 
mobilizations. Diaspora engagement with Kosovo remained more pronounced in 
contexts that had potential to further empower the Kosovo liberation struggle. 
Positionality of the US-based Albanian diaspora – the power diaspora entrepreneurs 
amass from a specific context vis-à-vis other actors in the transnational social field – 
remained relatively strong in pursuit of Kosovo’s independence. Even if distant from 
Kosovo geographically, the US-based diaspora remained contiguous sociospatially. It 
was highly mobilized during the war, and its linkages with lobby groups in New York 
and Washington remained sustained. As discussed elsewhere, it was also embedded in 
the US as a global power, major supporter for NATO’s intervention, which had a role 
to play for Kosovo’s statehood recognition. The New-York based Albanian-American 
Civil League (AACL) and Washington-based National Albanian American Council 
(NAAC) continued to play an important role throughout the 2000s (Koinova 2013).  
The Albanian diaspora in European countries – even if more geographically 
contiguous – remained embedded in contexts less empowering for the Kosovo diaspora 
in the pursuit of statehood. European politicians were less prone to empower further 
struggles in Kosovo, not least because European states have been traditionally more 
conservative regarding Kosovo independence Even in the UK, highly supportive of 
NATO’s intervention, interest in the Kosovo issue waned, and was difficult to sustain 
by a relatively small diaspora (70,000-100,000) (Koinova 2013). As discussions with 
respondents during my fieldwork in continental Europe point out,4 a much larger and 
well-mobilized diaspora in Switzerland (around 340,000/AD 2010) and Germany 
(around 550,000/AD 2010), remained largely disengaged in political terms. Political 
connections between Kosovo, Switzerland, and Germany were maintained between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I undertook field trips to Kosovo (2013), Sweden (2013-2014), Netherlands (2013), and Germany 
(2015).  
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states and via international institutions rather than via the diaspora. Even less diaspora 
activity could be discerned in Sweden and the Netherlands. 
By contrast to NATO’s intervention as a critical juncture, the 2004 mob 
violence in Kosovo constituted a transformative event and reshaped the mobilization 
trajectory for Kosovo’s self-determination struggle. In March 2004, violent Kosovar riots 
targeted the Serb minority in Kosovo, and destroyed their property and Orthodox 
churches, leading a UN official to compare these events to a “Kristallnacht,” the 1938 
pogroms against Jews in Germany (WT 9/04/2005). The violence in Kosovo sent 
urgent international messages: to avoid further violence, international powers needed 
to move further on “final status” negotiations. The 2004 events were transformative 
from the perspective of the social movements literature, because they changed the 
mobilization trajectories of those who mobilized for Kosovo recognition. The liberation 
struggle re-emerged on the policy agenda of the US and EU, revived claims for “final 
status” negotiations, and reactivated previously dormant diaspora networks. But they 
did not fundamentally redefine the relationship between diaspora and de facto state, as 
did the 1999 critical juncture. 
These events did not have the same repercussions across different contexts. 
Positionality of diaspora entrepreneurs in some contexts was relatively stronger than in 
others, as certain contexts were more empowering to re-engage with issues of Kosovo 
statehood recognition. The effect was again strongest in the US, the global power, 
which could decisively impact final status negotiations. As pointed out elsewhere, 
former KLA fund-raiser Florin Krasniqi spoke openly how gaps in the system of US 
border security allowed weapons to be shipped to Albania and Kosovo (Klaartjie 2005). 
The Atlantic Battalion, which had earlier drafted US-based Albanian diaspora members 
to fight in Kosovo during the war, also issued a warning (Albanews Archives 2007). 
Most notably, Swiss billionaire Behgjet Pacolli contributed to independence by 
lobbying in Washington, where he established a group of paid lobbyists (Free Republic 
2007). By contrast, minimal lobby activities followed in the UK (Koinova 2013). 
Conversations with interviewees in Germany also show that after the 2004 mob 
violence diaspora entrepreneurs sought to intensify contacts with Germany’s 
parliament and government, but much less effort was spent in Sweden and the 
Netherlands. In short, the 2004 riots were not consequential in the same way for 
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diasporas in different contexts. They had a primary effect on diaspora individuals 
empowered by their embeddedness in powerful states with a say on Kosovo’s future.  
The final example speaks to the idea that critical events can have systemic 
effects from one part of the transnational social field to another; such events need not 
emanate from an original homeland, but can come from another part of the field. 
Violent events in Kumanovo in ethnically mixed neighboring Macedonia are the 
transformative event in point. In May 2015, ten Albanian gunmen, primarily associated 
with the dismantled KLA, and eight Macedonian police officers were killed in a two-day 
shootout with Macedonian police (Dimovski 2016). An incident in April preceded this 
event, when forty ethnic Albanians from Kosovo briefly seized a Macedonian police 
station in a village near the Kosovo border, and demanded creation of an Albanian 
state within Macedonia (BBC 11/05/2015).  
Even if these events were not a critical juncture, they still sent shockwaves 
throughout the Albanian diaspora, whether linked to Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, or 
Montenegro. They touched on an unresolved grievance in the larger Albanian space. 
Albanians in Macedonia have been discontented with the implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (2001), which ended brief internal warfare between Albanians 
and Macedonians, but did not devolve power to the large Albanian minority in ways 
they envisaged. In the Albanian transnational social field also, a highly controversial 
statement was made by Albania’s prime minister Edi Rama shortly before the 
Kumanovo events, that unification of Albania and Kosovo is “inevitable,” whether 
through EU membership or outside it (Bytyci and Robinson 2015). Local tensions have 
been mounting and troubling the Albanian diaspora as a whole, considering ways to 
help (R4, 2015), and raising concerns about presumed ethnic Albanian unrest in the 
Balkans (UK Albanians 11/05/2015). Grievances and violence against Albanians in the 
Balkans has continued to fuel Albanians in the diaspora and their pan-Albanian 
sentiments (R3, 2015). Thus, even if these critical events did not have the power to 
transform the contentious trajectory completely, they added to a long-cherished 
nationalist dream in the diaspora to establish an unified Albanian state of all Albanian-
inhabited territories. 
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Diaspora Mobilization for Palestinian Statehood  
A transnational social field built through interactions among Palestinians 
emerged as a result of long-term conflicts in the Middle East and exodus of Palestinians 
due to warfare. The Palestinian issue dates back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration, 
pronouncing Britain’s support for the “establishment of Palestine as the national home 
for the Jewish people” (Balfour Declaration 1917), in the context of the British 
Mandate of Palestine. In the Palestinian narrative, this is the first critical juncture to 
determine many of the traumatic events to follow during the 20th century. A second 
critical juncture occurred in 1948, when during the Israeli war of independence, Israeli 
forces killed and displaced an estimated 700,000 Palestinians from their homes, 
causing what Palestinians refer to as the “Nakbah” or “catastrophe.” This is a defining 
traumatic experience for the Palestinian people, commemorated at home and abroad 
(Khalili 2009). The 1948 exodus sent many to neighboring Arab territories, primarily 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq (Kabha 2014:141-151). A third critical juncture 
occurred during the 1967 war, when Israel won the so-called 1967 “Six Day War” with 
neighboring Arab governments, creating more than 300,000 Palestinian refugees and 
placing more than one million others under Israeli control in the West Bank, Gaza 
Strip, and East Jerusalem (Brynen and El-Rifai 2013:2, Encyclopedia Britannica 2015). 
Palestinians abroad eventually formed resistance groups; the most powerful became the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), recognized by the UN as the “representative 
of the Palestinian people” (UN XXIX 3210, 1974). Other formations, reflecting the 
factionalism of national the movement included Fatah (a dominant PLO faction) and 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Hiltermann 1991:50). Secret 
negotiations involving the PLO paved the way for the 1993 Oslo Peace agreement, 
permitting limited autonomy of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians.  
These milestones of Palestinian history have been documented extensively, even 
if controversially. For space limitations, I focus here on two more recent critical 
junctures that redefined the relationship between the diaspora and the state: the 1993 
Oslo Accords and the 2000 Second Intifada  (known as Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 
conjuncture with the US 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Palestinian struggle witnessed 
numerous transformative events, such as the Gaza Flotilla raid (2010), several Israeli 
bombing campaigns of Gaza (2008-2009, 2010, 2012, 2014), and an upgrade of 
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Palestine to non-member observer state status in the UN (2012). I focus here on the 
2014 Gaza War, which profoundly changed a diaspora mobilization trajectory, 
especially associated with the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, and 
catapulted it into a global movement.  
The Oslo Accords constituted a critical juncture when a well-mobilized diaspora 
movement was re-embedded into homeland territory. Before 1993, the PLO operated 
for a long time “outside” the homeland territory, hosted by Arab governments until 
proving politically and militarily problematic for them. Recurrent violence between 
Palestinian fighters and Jordanian security forces (1970-1971) triggered the PLO 
expulsion from Jordan (Robinson 2009) and change of headquarters to Lebanon. 
Palestinian fighters became embroiled in the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), and 
needed to change headquarters again after the 1982 Israeli invasion, this time to 
Tunisia (Kabha 2014:293). The 1987 First Intifada (uprising against Israeli occupation) 
exposed the PLO leadership shortcomings (Sayigh 1997:30), eventually bringing a 
realization that goals could not be achieved from abroad.  
The Oslo Accords developed the fundamentals of a de facto state. They 
permitted Palestinian autonomous self-government in the West Bank and Gaza to 
incorporate administrative areas such as education, health, and social affairs, but put 
restrictions on autonomy in security and economic terms as Israel continued to exercise 
control over these areas (Schulz 2003:143). The Accords envisaged that final status 
negotiations on Palestinian statehood take place no later than five years after initiation 
of self-rule, or 1999 (142). The “center of gravity” (Hanafi 2005) of the movement 
changed from the diaspora to the West Bank and Gaza, and the state-building project 
assumed central importance, overshadowing concerns about the “right to return” 
embedded in UN Resolutions 194 and 3236, and previously vigorously pursued by the 
PLO.  
The effects of the Oslo Accords did not yield uniform response across the 
Palestinian transnational social field. PLO remained anchored in diaspora circles, 
where its functions waned, as it became closely associated with the Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) governing the Palestinian territories. In contrast, the Islamic group 
Hamas refused to be subsumed under the PNA governance, and chose a path of 
resistance against Israel instead (Kabha 2014:341). It started growing as a non-state 
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actor outside these territories, having been outlawed by Israel in 1989 and found refuge 
for its political decision-making body in Jordan (Tamimi 2009:192, 199, Seurat 2016). 
Hamas remained also popular in Gaza, and started actively building networks abroad. 
Resentment against the PLO and eventually PNA mounted also from other territorially 
dispersed Palestinians outside the negotiated territories, especially in Lebanon and 
Jordan. They considered that the West Bank and Gaza were “saved at the expense of 
the 1948 people” (Schulz 2003:147).  
The uneven response to the Oslo Accords in the transnational social field was 
also due to how diaspora entrepreneurs became empowered through their 
positionalities in different contexts. Long-term established secular networks of business 
and professional communities existed, especially in Western countries, remained closer 
to PLO and PNA, as some of their members were earlier PLO activists. Professional 
communities were strong in the Gulf, US, Canada, and UK in the 1990s, and more 
recently established in France (Hanafi 2005a:583). But in the US, numerous diaspora 
members responded also with large-scale resentment against the Accords, considering it 
disregarding the refugee issue (Gertheiss 2016:134). North American communities, 
despite their more distant location, have been generally better connected to the 
Palestinian territories (Hanafi 2005b:145), hence more closely watching and associating 
with events in them.  
Operating under the radar screen in foreign countries, after Oslo Hamas 
capitalized on its popular appeal in grassroots networks, and appeal through charitable 
social services and building communities abroad. As Katzman argues, both Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad relied on outside support to sustain their operations. Major financial 
support came from territorially adjacent areas, such as Iran, Syria, Jordan, and the 
Persian Gulf, but also from the US through individual diaspora members. Before 
Hamas was declared a terrorist organization by major Western countries in the mid-
1990s, private money from the US and UK supplied Hamas with 33 to 40 percent of 
its budget (1995:33-38). Hamas also raised funds through illicit activity in the loosely 
governed Tri-Border Area in Latin America (Jacobson and Levitt 2009:7). 
The second critical juncture analyzed here is the period 2000-2006, when prior 
mobilization of Hamas from “outside” the homeland territory became embedded inside 
it. The Second Intifada erupted in September 2000 as a result of the failure of the 
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Camp David negotiations to broker peace and establish the fundamentals of 
Palestinian statehood. The grassroots activism this time was “not a mass movement of 
resistance, as the First Intifada” (R4 2016), but a militarized action under Hamas 
tutelage. Had the Intifada (2000-2005) erupted at a different time from a year before 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it could probably be classified as a transformative event. It 
initially changed the movement trajectory by incorporating different tactics to pursue 
Palestinian statehood, renewing violent resistance against occupation. Yet this event did 
occur in short sequence with the 9/11 attacks, which intensified the global crackdown 
on Islamist extremism, and brought profound transformations to world politics. Hamas 
was blacklisted as a terrorist organization by the US in 1995 and the EU in 2001, with 
further restrictions imposed on charities considered “fronts” for illegal activities. Hamas 
became more constrained internationally, but global polarization empowered it 
domestically and in 2006 for the first time elected it to political power in Gaza. 
Through this new critical juncture, Islamic doctrine, which previously operated largely 
“outside” the homeland territory, became embedded in it, and started competing on a 
territorial basis with a secularist status quo. 
During this critical juncture, diaspora activism was also empowered through 
different positionalities in the Palestinian transnational social field. Although the US 
was a global power with influential say on the Palestinian issue, a strong Israeli lobby 
and anti-terrorism measures created a context not conducive to diaspora mobilization 
for Palestinian statehood. In theoretical terms, the US positionality of the Palestinian 
diaspora was weakened vis-à-vis other diaspora actors in the transnational social field, 
while Palestinian diaspora actors became slightly better empowered in Europe. As 
Gertheiss points out, US suspicion against Arab-Americans rose significantly, with 
implicit or explicit allegations as accomplices of terrorism and anti-Americanism 
(Marrar 2009:108-109). Simultaneously, new organizations emerged, such as the 
grassroots Palestine Right of Return Coalition (Al-Awda) and the elite-based American 
Task Force for Palestine (ATFP), a lobby group in Washington. Nevertheless, their 
activism faced difficulties, as “some politicians even hid their ethnicity as they regarded 
it detrimental to their careers” (135). Certain charities were put on a terrorist list, and 
the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) became a repeated target of 
terrorism charges (Shane 2011). Following the 2006 Hamas electoral victory in Gaza, 
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the US and Israel imposed sanctions on the PNA and prohibited all Hamas-related 
financial transactions. Diaspora activists increasingly framed the Palestinian national 
interest in terms of American interests and values (Gertheiss 2016:134-138).  
In contrast, Europe remained a more conducive context for diaspora 
mobilization. The EU defined Hamas’ military wing as a terrorist organization in 2001, 
and put Hamas on its terrorist list in 2003. But these decisions were challenged in the 
European Court of Justice, leading to a 2014 court recommendation to remove Hamas 
from the list, subsequently appealed (Osborne 2016, EU:C:2016:722). As several 
interviewees in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, and France indicated, in a 
transnational social field encompassing other European countries, the UK was 
considered in a leadership position in Palestinian diaspora activism (R4, 2016, R5, 
2013, R6, 2013, R7, 2015). The UK was an empowering context for several reasons. 
There was a strong grievance against the UK as a former colonial power, which paved 
the way with the 1917 Balfour Declaration for the creation of Israel. Palestinian 
activists in the UK have claimed Britain needs to “take the blame” and apologize 
(Nabulsi 2006:211, 241, 242; Safieh 2010:116, Koinova 2014). In July 2016, the PNA 
even started preparing a lawsuit against the UK government over the Balfour 
Declaration (Times of Israel 25/07/2016). Also, in the UK antiwar solidarity and Islamic 
networks remained strong. Palestine is “both a site for struggle to decolonize itself and a 
key node in the globally networked struggle to decolonize a world currently structured 
on inequality and injustice” (Collins 2011:18). The Stop the War Coalition and the 
Palestinian Solidarity Campaign have shown strong socialist inclinations in support of a 
campaign to boycott Israel. Islamic networks such as Interpal, Islamic Relief, Islamic 
Help, Viva Palestina, and other organizations have been highly active on mobilizing 
religious networks for the Palestinian issue and breaking the siege of Gaza (Koinova 
2014). Also, the global city of London, considered a “media capital” of the Arab world, 
empowered Palestinians to use protests and enhance the visibility of their cause 
(Koinova 2012, Adamson and Koinova 2013). 
The transformative event of theoretical interest here is the 2014 Gaza War 
between Israel and Hamas, which resulted in extraordinary destruction of homes, 
infrastructure, estimated 2,000 Palestinian deaths, and further civilian casualties. It 
triggered large-scale global protests, more than 1,200 in summer 2014, which occurred 
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on all continents, with concentrations in the UK, Netherlands, Sweden, France, US, 
and others in Australia, South Africa, and Latin America (Samidoun 2014). They often 
involved more than 10,000 people. Emergency financial appeals to support Palestinians 
in Gaza were launched in Islamic and non-Islamic networks too. 
The Gaza War was a tipping point in a shift of a global sentiment, earlier less 
critical about Israel than after this war. Although “high politics” on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict have not changed significantly since, grassroots attitudes “from 
below” have been shifting the trajectory of the movement. The clearest shift in activism 
is observed in the growing global support for the BDS movement, seeking to boycott 
Israeli goods, services, and academic and cultural exchanges. The BDS was created in 
the early 2000s to resemble the earlier global campaign against apartheid in South 
Africa (Tutu 2013). Launched officially in 2005, it started serving as “the largest 
coalition of Palestinian civil society organizations inside historic Palestine and in exile” 
(Barghouti 2011:5, 61). Yet even from inception, the campaign has incorporated 
numerous non-Palestinians through solidarity networks.  
The Gaza War created a major difference for the mobilization trajectory of the 
movement to amass more support for the economic, cultural, and academic boycott. 
The Congress of South African Trade Unions sought to intensify its support (News24, 
26/08/2014), as did the Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux of Canada 
representing nearly 2,000 unions in 2015 (Houle 2016). In the UK, where the 
campaign has been exceptionally strong from the outset, numerous individuals and 
institutions joined the boycott. UK’s Unite the Union joined the movement in July 
2014 (Soffer 06/07/2014), as did London’s School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS) after a university-wide referendum in February 2015 (Asfour 28/02/2015). 
BDS gained new support especially on college campuses in the US (Alterman 2016). 
Even though legally suppressed in France, it gathered numerous followers, many of 
them French citizens with no origins in the Middle East (R4, 2016).  
 
Conclusions 
This article draws attention to the need to analyze how critical events in one 
part of the globe affect diaspora mobilization in another in more theoretical depth. In 
the relatively new research agenda of diaspora mobilizations for conflicts and post-
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conflict reconstruction, empirical evidence has shown that critical events affecting 
diaspora politics are often associated with crises in the homeland or inauguration of 
peace processes and democratization. “Critical junctures” have been mentioned to 
describe such events, but little has been done to understand their profound impact on 
the relationship between diasporas and states and to distinguish them from what the 
social movements literature calls “transformative events.” 
This article makes three important theoretical points. First, critical junctures 
and transformative events have different capacities to affect diaspora mobilization 
movements. Critical junctures are characterized by high volatility and contingency of 
decision-making in domestic and international politics, when there is an increased role 
for agents to influence volatile processes, including for diaspora entrepreneurs as non-
state actors. During critical junctures, a strategic center pursuing a homeland-oriented 
goal, changes position from “outside” to “inside” a homeland territory, and vice versa. 
Transformative events are less powerful but have the capacity to change diaspora 
mobilization trajectories without fundamentally affecting the relationship between 
diaspora and homeland territory. Transformative events make diaspora entrepreneurs 
expand or contract their mobilizations while remaining embedded in the contexts in 
which they live. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates the differential effects of critical junctures and 
transformative events. I showed how Kosovo Albanians, dispersed after the end of the 
Cold War from their homeland, were highly mobilized in the diaspora through 
strategic centers “outside” Kosovo. After the 1999 NATO military intervention, a 
critical juncture that transformed domestic and international institutions and 
structures, diaspora entrepreneurs managed to re-embed themselves “inside” homeland 
territory and assume governance functions. Similarly, the PLO was highly mobilized 
“outside” Palestinian territories before the 1993 Oslo Accords, yet through negotiations 
during the critical juncture managed to reinsert itself “inside” and assume important 
functions through the Palestinian Authority, even if officially remaining abroad.  The 
outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000 and the 9/11 US terrorist attacks, which came 
shortly thereafter, transformed the relationship between Hamas and the Palestinian 
state. While prior to 2000-2001, Hamas organized primarily outside Palestinian 
territories while remaining popular in Gaza, it managed to embed itself officially 
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“inside” the state through the 2006 election to power in Gaza. The 2004 mob violence 
in Kosovo, the 2015 violence in Kumanovo in Macedonia, and the 2014 war in Gaza 
were transformative events, which enhanced diaspora activism, but did not 
fundamentally redefine the relationship between diaspora and state.  
The second theoretical point is to show that critical junctures and 
transformative events do not have the same effects across the transnational social field 
in which diasporas operate. Mobilizations depend on the sociospatial positionality of 
diaspora entrepreneurs in different contexts, especially vis-à-vis other actors in the field. 
I have shown how the US, as a global power with an important say for Kosovo’s final 
status, remained an empowering context for diaspora mobilization for Kosovo’s 
statehood in the 2000s, even though the diaspora had generally withdrawn its efforts to 
support Kosovo during this period. By contrast, US policies regarding the Palestinian 
issue were defined by the war on terrorism and suppression of movements and 
organizations after 9/11. Thus, the US became a less conducive context for Palestinian 
diaspora mobilization, unlike the UK, where Palestinians became empowered by a 
grievance against colonial decisions, London’s Arab media scene, and multiple 
solidarity and Islamic networks.  
The third theoretical point is that critical events do not take place simply in 
host-lands and homelands, as scholarship considering a triangular model of 
relationships between diasporas, home-states, and host-state tend to indicate. They take 
place in other areas of the transnational social field to which diasporas are sociospatially 
connected and which they observe from afar. I have shown briefly how violent events in 
Kumanovo in Macedonia have reinvigorated discussions about the larger Albanian 
space in the Albanian diaspora. This finding speaks even more broadly to the 
Palestinian case, where critical events “outside” the currently considered homeland in 
West Bank and Gaza have been even more numerous. Palestinians have been living, for 
decades in the refugee camps in Lebanon, and in Jordan and other Middle Eastern 
locations. Recent work by Gabiam and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016), for example, shows 
how Palestinians abroad became mobilized regarding violent events in the Yarmuk 
refugee camp, attacked by ISIS, as it has been a space to which Palestinians abroad hold 
transnational linkages. In short, this article shows how in cases of diasporas related to 
polities experiencing contested sovereignty – such as Kosovo and Palestine – critical 
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events in different parts of the transnational social field have the capacity to change 
either relationships between diaspora and the state or to fundamentally transform their 
mobilization trajectories. 
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